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Abstract
The paper studies in a simple, Downsian model of political com-
petition how the private provision of public goods is a¤ected when
it is embedded in a system of democracy and redistributive taxation.
Results show that the positive e¤ect of inequality on public goods pro-
duction, which Olson (1965) pointed to, is weakened and might even
be reversed in this context. Also, the median voter may choose a nega-
tive tax rate, even if he is poorer than the mean, in order to stimulate
public goods production. The relevance of the model is illustrated with
an application to the nance of higher education.
JEL Codes: D31, D7, H2, H41, I22
Keywords: Public goods, political economy, inequality, taxation, higher
education
1 Introduction1
One of the primary justications for the existence of the state is its ability
to produce public goods. However, not all public goods are produced by the
state, nor could they be. An important example is the generation of knowl-
edge and innovation. While the state in most countries sponsors universities
and other research facilities, large amounts of formal and informal innova-
tion with important spill-over e¤ects nevertheless takes place in the private
sector. In countries where the capacity of the state is low, the production
of public goods such as infrastructure, environmental protection and even
security might be fully or partly left to private agents.
This paper investigates in a simple, Downsian model of electoral com-
petition how the private provision of public goods interacts with the insti-
tutions of democracy and taxation. We assume that a public good, such
as non-excludable innovation, is produced by the private sector, but that
the income derived from the good is taxed at a (positive or negative) rate
determined by a democratically elected political leader. The paper stud-
ies how democracy, taxation and economic inequality a¤ect the production
of the public good. In particular, two seemingly divergent ndings from
the literature are brought together: on the one hand, Mancur Olson (1965)
and others have argued that higher inequality increases the supply of public
goods, because only the most well-endowed agents in an economy have the
incentives to contribute to the production of these goods. Redistribution in
favour of these agents strengthens their incentives to produce. On the other
hand, Meltzer and Richard (1981), building on Romer (1975), argued that
in a democracy, higher inequality leads to lower economic activity, because
a poorer median voter, relative to the mean, prefers a higher tax rate, which
diminishes incentives for production.2 The present paper shows that when
democracy and taxation are introduced in a public goods dependant econ-
omy, the Olson- and Meltzer-Richard e¤ects tend to cancel out. The
net e¤ect of economic inequality on production might be either positive or
negative.
The results also suggest that in a su¢ ciently equal, public goods depen-
dant economy, the introduction of democracy and taxation improves welfare
for both the median voter and for the wealthy elite, and increases total eco-
1 I am grateful for very useful comments from Thomas B. Andersen, David D. Lassen,
Morten Hedgaard, Tobias E. Markeprand, Finn Tarp, Jean-Robert Tyran, seminar partic-
ipants at the University of Copenhagen and two anonymous reviewers. Remaining errors
are my own.
2Several studies, including Lindert (1996), Perotti (1996) and Moene and Wallerstein
(2001) have argued that the emprical support for the hypothesis that inequality leads to
redistribution is weak. Harms and Zink (2003) summarize a series of theoretical arguments
that rationalize these ndings. However, Milanovic (2000, 2010) shows that when the
theoretically relevant variables are used, the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis does nd strong
support in a sample of mostly developed countries.
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nomic production. It might even represent a Pareto improvement. This
contrasts with standard models of redistributive taxation, such as Meltzer
and Richards, where democracy and taxation always lead to lower produc-
tion and is never a Pareto improvement. These results may contribute to
explaining why it is easier to consolidate democracy in equal than in unequal
societies.
Section 2 presents the model of public goods, democracy and redistrib-
utive taxation. Sections 3 discusses the e¤ects of inequality on public goods
production, while section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of introducing democracy.
Section 5 considers a specic type of public goods production function,
namely a power function. Section 6 presents an extension of the model,
where the capacity of each agent to contribute to the public goods is as-
sumed to be limited. In section 7, the empirical relevance of the model is
illustrated by applying it to the study of higher education funding. Un-
der plausible assumptions, the model predicts that equal countries are more
prone to engage in public funding of higher education than unequal ones.
This conjecture is supported in an analysis of government spending on ter-
tiary education in a broad sample of countries.
2 Model
2.1 Public goods production
Consider an economy consisting of N individuals, indexed i = 1 : : : N . For
concreteness, think of a local, rural economy in a developing country and
think of the agents as farmers or shermen. Each agent maximizes the
following utility function:
Ui =
XiPN
j=1Xj
G
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  ei = xiG
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  ei
subject to:
ei  0
where the rst term represents income from a public good, G
PN
j=1 ej

,
which is converted one-to-one into utility. Assume that G  0; G0 > 0
and G00 < 0: The second term ( ei) represents the disutility derived from
supplying e¤ort to the production of this good. This could be interpreted
either as disutility of labour, or as the opportunity cost of e¤ort stemming
from the possibility of producing a private good with the use of e. Assume
for now that there are no binding, upper constraints on ei. This assumption
is relaxed in section 6 below. Xi represents individual i0s holding of some
good which determines her stake in the public good. xi is then i0s share
of the total, xed amount of X in the economy. This formulation of the
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public goods problem follows Baland and Platteau (1997). G could for
example be the production of knowledge. In developing country agriculture
there is often a large premium on the introduction of new crop varieties
or production techniques, such as the use of chemical fertilizers. However,
the protability of new production methods depends on knowledge about
how they are optimally adapted to local circumstances. This knowledge is
often a public good, because production methods and outcomes are easy to
observe in agriculture. When one farmer experiments with new techniques,
the lessons gained from the experiment will be picked up and learned by
other farmers in the area. Other important public goods could be irrigation
canals or roads. X could be interpreted as agricultural land. For example,
the more land a household owns, the more it will gain from an increase in
knowledge about new production methods in agriculture. Also, the amount
of land in a given community is more or less xed. X could also be other
things, for example the number of shing boats in a community of shermen.
In the following, I refer to X as "assets". The equilibrium is characterized
by the following set of rst order conditions:
xiG
0
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  1 = 0 (1)
or
ei = 0
for all i: Note that the rst order conditions di¤er among individuals only by
the term xi. This means that in the unique Nash equilibrium, the individual
with the highest value of xi is the sole contributor to the public good. Denote
this individual by r (for rich). rs e¤ort level equals:
er = G
0 1(x 1r ) =  (x
 1
r ) (2)
where we dene the function  as the inverse of the rst derivative of G. Be-
cause G is strictly concave,  exists and is a strictly decreasing function (by
the Inverse Function Theorem,  0( 1) = 1=G00( ( 1)) < 0). This im-
plies that @er@xr , and hence
@G
@xr
, are strictly positive. This is the Olson-e¤ect
the more the asset distribution is skewed towards the richest individual,
the higher is the production of the public good.3
2.2 Democracy and redistributive taxes
Now, assume that democracy and a redistributive scal system are intro-
duced. Particularly, the income generated by the public good is taxed at a
3Bergstrom et. al. (1986) also nd that "equalizing income redistributions tend to
reduce the voluntary provision of a public good" (p. 27).
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uniform rate  < 1 and the revenue is distributed evenly among all agents.
The total revenue from taxation is:
NX
i=1
xiG
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A = G
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A :
The transfer t received by each agent is therefore equal to:
t =

N
G
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A :
The tax rate is determined by a democratically elected political leader.
Specically, two o¢ ce-motivated candidates commit credibly to policies be-
fore elections are held, and the winner implements his announced policy,
W . The timing is as follows:
1. Candidates A and B announce policies, A and B
2. Elections are held
3. Winner implements W
4. Agents choose ei and production is realized
We solve the model backwards. Assuming that the transfer, like the
income from the public good, is converted one-to-one into utility, agents
now maximize:
Ui = (1  )xiG
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A+ 
N
G
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  ei (3)
For reasons parallel to those mentioned above, the wealthiest agent, r,
is the only contributor to the public good. When choosing her e¤ort level,
r now faces the following rst order condition:
(1  )xr + 
N

G0 (er)  1 = 0
Solving for er we nd:
er =  

(1  )xr + 
N
 1
(4)
The derivatives of er with respect to xr and  are, respectively:
@er
@xr
=   (1  ) 0   1 2 > 0 (5)
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@er
@
=

xr   1
N

 0
 
 1

 2 < 0 (6)
where  = (1  )xr + N > 0: Since  0( 1) < 0, the derivative with re-
spect to xr is positive as long as  is lower than one, which we have assumed.
Thus, for a given tax-rate, the Olson-e¤ect is still present - redistribution
towards the richest agent increases public goods production. The derivative
with respect to  is negative because xr is larger than 1N (note that
1
N is
the average value of xi). This means that a higher tax-rate leads to lower
supply of e¤ort, as we would expect.
Rational voters take the incentive e¤ects described by (4) into account
when calculating their preferred tax-rate. Inserting (4) into (3) and rear-
ranging, we obtain:
Ui =

xi + (
1
N
  xi)

G
 
 
 
xr + (
1
N
  xr)
 1!!
(7)
for i 6= r. The rst order conditions with respect to  are (exploiting the
fact that G0
 
 
 
 1

=  1):
@Ui
@
=

1
N
  xi

G
 
 
 
 1

+

xr   1
N

xi + (
1
N
  xi)

 0( 1) 3 = 0 (8)
This can only hold if xi < 1N . To see this, note that the second term is
always negative and the rst term is positive only if xi < 1N . The economic
reason is the following: Agents with fewer assets than the average, i.e. with
xi <
1
N , receive more in transfers than they pay in tax. They therefore face
a dilemma: on the one hand, a higher tax rate gives them higher transfers.
On the other, it also reduces the richest agentsincentive to contribute to
the public good. Hence, for these agents there is an optimal tax rate which
just balances these opposing forces. In contrast, agents with xi > 1N pay
more in taxes than they receive in transfers and therefore always wish to set
the tax rate as low as possible.
Assuming that xi < 1N ; equation (8) implicitly denes the optimal tax
rate of agent i, i , as a function of the agents relative wealth, xi:We assume
that i is a unique maximum and investigate how changes in wealth a¤ect
the preferred tax rate.4 By the Implicit Function Theorem, we have that:
4The appendix shows that a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for Ui to be univer-
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di
dxi
=  
@2U(i )
@@xi
@2U(i )
@2i
< 0 (9)
We obtain the sign of the numerator in this expression by di¤erentiating
the left-hand side of (8) with respect to xi:
@2U
@@xi
=  G     1
+ (1  )

xr   1
N

G0
 
 ( 1)

 0( 1) 2 < 0
The resulting expression is negative. The interpretation is that the mar-
ginal utility of redistribution is decreasing in wealth. Since i is a maximum,
the denominator in (9) is also negative. This means that di =dxi is negative.
A wealthier agent always prefers a lower tax-rate, in line with conventional
thinking. Now, the fact that the preferred tax-rate is a monotonic function
of xi, in combination with the features of the political system described
above, means that we can apply the median voter theorem. The two candi-
dates announce the same policy, namely the tax rate preferred by the voter
with the median value of xi, denoted xm. We assume, as is common in the
literature and very well justied by empirics, that xm < 1N , that is, that
the median asset holding is lower than the mean. This means that an op-
timal tax rate exists for agent m, which implies that we have identied the
Meltzer-Richard e¤ect: Equation (9) implies that a wealthier median voter
always prefers a lower tax-rate. By (6) this in turn means that a wealthier
median voter, ceteris paribus, leads to a higher e¤ort level supplied by r and
consequently to a higher level of public goods production. In this sense, a
more equal asset distribution now has a positive e¤ect on the level of pro-
duction. What remains is to investigate whether and when the Olson-e¤ect,
identied in equation (5), or the Meltzer-Richard-e¤ect dominates. In other
words, we need to check what the net e¤ects of distributional changes on
public goods production are.
3 The e¤ect of inequality
Two di¤erent conceptions of inequality are in play. The Olson e¤ect de-
pends on the relative position of the wealthiest individual, while the Meltzer-
Richard e¤ect depends on the relative position of the median asset holder. In
sally concave in  is that the third derivative of G is negative. As the example in section
5 shows, it is also easy to nd examples of production functions with positive third deriv-
atives where the the rst order conditions dene a unique, optimal tax rate as a function
of wealth.
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general, it is possible to make equalizing as well as dis-equalizing redistribu-
tions that make both the wealthiest and the median agent better (or worse)
o¤. It is most interesting to focus on the cases where the median agent gains
at the expense of the wealthiest, or vice versa. Assume, therefore, that xr
is a negative function of xm. We use xm as our index of inequality (a higher
value indicates less inequality). The e¤ect of changes in the relative wealth
of the median agent on the supply of e¤ort by the richest is given by:
der
dxm
=
@er
@xm
+
@er
@
@
@xm
(10)
The rst term in this expression is negative, by equation (5), and rep-
resents the Olson e¤ect. The second term is positive and represents the
Meltzer-Richard e¤ect. The equation emphasizes that the two e¤ects tend
to cancel each other, leaving public goods production less a¤ected by distri-
bution in a system of democracy and redistributive taxes than in anarchy.
Consider again the median voters choice of a tax rate. Before the tax
system is introduced, the agents of this economy face a collective action
problem. Each would be better o¤ if they could credibly commit to supply-
ing a positive amount of e¤ort towards the production of the public good.
Now, by assumption, the tax-system is an implementable system of trans-
fers between agents in the economy. This means that the system serves
two functions from the point of view of the median voter. First, taking
production as given, it can be used to transfer income from the wealthy to
himself (the redistributive function). Second, however, it is also a poten-
tial tool for solving the collective action problem because it can be used to
compensate the richest agent for the positive externalities of her productive
e¤ort (the compensatory function). The median voter optimally balances
the redistributive and compensatory functions of the tax system. When he
has no assets, the redistributive function dominates completely. Transfers
are the only source of income and he prefers a strictly positive tax rate. In
general, the net transfer received by m is
 
1
N   xm

G(er). As the wealth
of the median voter approaches 1N from below, this expression goes to zero.
Therefore, the compensatory function necessarily at some point comes to
dominate the redistributive, and the preferred tax rate turns negative.5 A
median voter with relative wealth equal to the mean receives no net trans-
fers and prefers a heavy, negative tax rate in order to stimulate production.
Since m is a monotonous function of xm, there is a unique level of median
voter wealth, x0m, which induces the median voter to choose  = 0: This
is also the unique point where public goods production under the system
of democracy and redistributive taxation equals production under anarchy.
5The possibility of a regressive taxation scheme (i.e with  < 0) is not emprirically
unrealistic. For example, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) nd that the taxation schemes of
Indian Panchayats (local governments) are on average regressive.Wang and Piesse (2009)
argue that the system of taxes and subsidies in China is regressive.
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For xm < x0m; production is lower under democracy and taxation than un-
der anarchy. For xm > x0m on the other hand, production is higher under
democracy and taxation. On average over the range of xm, the relationship
between inequality and public goods production is therefore less steeply pos-
itive under democracy and taxation than under anarchy. As demonstrated
in the example in section 5, the e¤ect of inequality may even be negative.
Under some circumstances, transfers benetting the median asset holder at
the expense of the wealthiest individual lead to an increase in production,
rather than a decrease. These result are illustrated in Figure 1 below, and
summarized in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 In a public goods dependant economy like the one described
in section 2, the introduction of democracy and redistributive taxation re-
duces the positive e¤ect of inequality on the production of public goods. The
e¤ect of inequality may even turn negative.
4 The e¤ect of democracy
In the standard Meltzer-Richard model with private instead of public goods,
the introduction of democracy and redistributive taxation always leads to a
decline in economic activity and to a more equal distribution of income, as
long as the median voter is poorer than the mean. This is simply because
the median voter always chooses a positive tax-rate, which decreases the
incentives to supply e¤ort and redistributes income from the rich to the
poor. In contrast, the e¤ects of introducing democracy and taxation in the
model described above depend on the initial level of asset inequality. If
xm < x
0
m, the e¤ects from the standard model are replicated: m prefers a
positive tax-rate, production falls and the distribution of income becomes
more equal. However, if xm > x0m, m sets a negative tax rate, leading to an
increase in production, as illustrated in Figure 1, and an increase in income
inequality. These results are summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 When democracy and redistributive taxation are introduced
in a public goods-dependant economy, like the one described in section 2, the
e¤ects on production and income distribution depend on the initial level of
asset inequality. When the initial level of asset inequality is high, democ-
racy and taxation lead to a drop in production and a more equal income
distribution. When asset inequality is low, the opposite happens.
One corollary of Proposition 2 is that the introduction of democracy
and redistributive taxation improves welfare for both the median voter and
the richest agent over the situation with no government intervention, if the
initial asset distribution is su¢ ciently equal. If the poorest agent in the
economy has relative wealth high enough to make him prefer the negative
9
tax rate chosen by a median voter with xm > x0m over a tax rate equal to
zero, then the introduction of democracy and taxation in fact represents a
Pareto improvement. Baland and Platteau (1998) also make the point that
regulation of public goods problems only leads to Pareto improvements if
the distribution of resources complementary to the public good is su¢ ciently
equal. The contribution of the present paper is to show that this result
holds when policies are determined endogenously, rather than imposed. The
possibility that democracy and redistributive taxation can lead to Pareto
improvements and increase economic production stand in contrast to the
standard Meltzer-Richard model (with private instead of public goods) in
which democracy and redistribution never lead to Pareto improvements and
always lower aggregate production when the median voter is poorer than
the mean.
A further, possible corollary of Proposition 2 is that more equal soci-
eties will nd it easier to consolidate democracy. Of course, the relevant
alternative to democracy is not typically anarchy, but rather some form of
autocracy. However, if democracy increases the legitimacy of the state, it is
also likely to increase the feasibility of implementing a comprehensive sys-
tem of redistribution. This view was famously expressed in the slogan used
by colonists in the run up to American War of Independence: "No taxa-
tion without representation". The conjecture of a link between inequality
and democratic consolidation seems to accord well with empirical evidence
(Przeworski et. al. 2000). For example, di¤erences is inequality may be
part of the reason why democracy has been more stable in Western Europe
than in Latin America (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, chap. 6.5).
To summarize, the main results obtained so far are, rst, that the in-
troduction of democracy and taxation reduces, and possibly even cancels or
reverses, the positive e¤ect of inequality on public goods production, which
exists in anarchy. Second, in the public goods dependant economy, the me-
dian voter may choose a negative tax rate, even if he is poorer than the
mean, in order to stimulate the production of public goods. Third, for a
su¢ ciently equal asset distribution, the introduction of democracy and tax-
ation is a Pareto improvement over the situation with no intervention. In
order to obtain closed form solutions and thereby further develop intuition
for the main lessons of the model, we now consider a specic type of public
goods production function.
5 A parameterized production function
Assume that G is a concave power function:
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G0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A =
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A , 0 <  < 1
It is easy to show that in this case the e¤ort of the richest agent is given
by:
er =



xr + (
1
N
  xr)
 1
1 
(11)
The appendix shows that the equilibrium tax rate equals:
m =
(1  )xr
xr   1N
+
xm
xm   1N
(12)
For xm = 0, m is strictly positive. As xm approaches
1
N from below,
the desired tax rate of the median voter goes to minus innity, consistent
with the view that the compensatory function of the tax system comes to
dominate the redistributive function entirely. The wealth level that leads
the median voter to prefer a zero tax rate is x0m =
(1 )xr
Nxr  : Analyzing this
expression reveals that x0m is decreasing in , the elasticity of public goods
production with respect to e¤ort. The intuition is that a more e¤ective pro-
duction technology increases the incentives to subsidize production. Also,
x0m is decreasing in N , the size of the population. The intuition is that
higher population makes it more desirable to use the scal system to stim-
ulate public goods production, because a higher number agents share the
burden of subsidizing the public goods producer.
Now, in order to focus sharply on cases where the median agent gains
at the expense of the wealthiest, or vice versa, assume that the relationship
between the wealth levels of the richest- and the median agent, respectively,
takes the following, linear form:
xr = xr   kxm (13)
where 1=N < xr  1 and 0  k < xr=xm   1 (the last condition ensures
that r is indeed richer thanm): This formulation implies that a dxm increase
in the relative wealth of the median voter is accompanied by a kdxm drop
in the relative wealth of the richest person. Inserting (12) and (13) into
(11) and collecting terms, we obtain the following expression for e¤ort as a
function of median voter wealth:
er(xm) =

2

xm (k + 1)  xr
Nxm   1
 1
1 
(14)
Di¤erentiating with respect to xm and collecting terms, we get:
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@er
@xm
=
2
1  

2

xm (k + 1)  xr
Nxm   1
 
1 

N xr   1  k
(Nxm   1)2

(15)
The sign of this expression equals the sign of N xr 1 k. Increases in the
wealth of the median voter, at the expense of the richest individual, lead to
increases in public goods production if and only if k is smaller than N xr 1:
This means that the Meltzer-Richard e¤ect dominates the Olson e¤ect if
a) the drop in xr corresponding to a given increase in xm is su¢ ciently
small, b) population is su¢ ciently large and c) the base level wealth of the
richest individual, xr, is su¢ ciently high. The intuition behind the e¤ect of
population is, again, that higher population decreases the per capita cost of
subsidizing public goods production. As the stake of the median voter in
the public good increases, she is willing to decrease the tax rate faster when
population is large, because the benet to herself of doing so is increasing
in the number of tax payers. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between
median voter wealth and public goods production under anarchy as well as
under democracy and redistributive taxation. The latter case is shown for
both high and low values of k.
[Insert Figure 1]
One simple but interesting special case is when all agents have the same
asset holding, xm, except agent r who is wealthier. In terms of equation (13),
the parameter values characterizing this distribution are xr = 1 and k = N 
1. It is easy to verify that in this situation, the expression in (15) equals zero.
Therefore, this is a society where the Olson- and Meltzer Richard e¤ects
exactly cancel out, leaving the level of public goods production entirely
una¤ected by the distribution of assets, aptly exemplifying the general result
summarized in Proposition 1.
To summarize, the main contributions of this section are, rst, to demon-
strate by example that the e¤ect of inequality on production in the public
goods dependant economy with democracy and redistributive taxation might
be either positive or negative, depending on the parameters of the asset dis-
tribution. Second, the section also shows that the compensatory function
of the tax system more easily comes to dominate the redistributive function
when the public goods production technology is e¤ective and when popula-
tion is large.
6 Limits to the supply of e¤ort
We have assumed that agents are never constrained in their ability to supply
e¤ort to production of the public good. Under some circumstances, this
assumption may not be realistic. If e¤ort comes in the form of labour,
12
agents may be constrained if labour markets are imperfect. Likewise, if
e¤ort takes the form of monetary payments, imperfect credit markets may
impose constraints. In line with Baland and Platteau, 1997, we therefore
now assume that each agent faces a xed upper limit on e¤ort, denoted ei.
The following rst order conditions with respect to the choice of e¤ort now
apply: 
(1  )xi + 
N

G0
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  1 > 0 and ei = ei
or

(1  )xi + 
N

G0
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  1 = 0 and 0  ei  ei (16)
or

(1  )xi + 
N

G0
0@ NX
j=1
ej
1A  1 < 0 and ei = 0
Agents can be grouped into three groups: Constrained contributors sup-
ply as much e¤ort they can and would like to supply more. Denote the
set of constrained contributors by C. Unconstrained contributors supply a
positive amount of e¤ort, but are not constrained by the upper limit. Non-
contributors supply no e¤ort to production of the public good. If agents are
strictly ranked in terms of wealth, there will be at most one unconstrained
contributor. For simplicity we shall assume that there is indeed one and only
one agent of this type, denoted by u: Note that the rst-order conditions im-
mediately imply that constrained contributors are strictly wealthier than the
unconstrained contributor who is in turn wealthier than non-contributors.
The e¤ort of the unconstrained contributor is given by:
eu =  

(1  )xu + 
N
 1 X
j2C
ej (17)
Total e¤ort is therefore simply equal to  
 
(1  )xu + N
 1
: Com-
paring with (4) and noting that xu < xr, we see that production is strictly
lower with constrained capacities to contribute than without, even though
the number of agents supplying e¤ort is higher. Assume that the uncon-
strained contributor is richer than the mean, i.e. that xu > 1=N: This
means that we are still focusing on societies where public goods produc-
tion is undertaken by the relatively well o¤. The median voter, who is a
non-contributor, chooses the tax rate that maximizes:
Um =

(1  )xm + 
N

G

 

(1  )xu + 
N
 1
(18)
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Comparing equations (17) and (18) to equations (4) and (7) in section
2.2 above, we see that the analyses with- and without constrained e¤ort are
completely analogous. The role played by the richest agent, r, in the case
with no constraints on contributions is simply taken by the unconstrained
contributor, u, in the case of constrained ability to contribute. Interpretation
of results, on the other hand, is somewhat more complicated in the case of
constrained capacity to contribute, especially when it comes to analyzing the
e¤ects of inequality. As shown in Baland and Platteau, 1997, inequality is
no longer unambiguously good for public goods production, even in anarchy.
For example, transfers from the unconstrained- to a constrained contributor
increase inequality but decrease production. In societies with democracy
and redistributive taxation, transfers from the median voter to constrained
contributors have the same e¤ect. In this sense, the introduction of limits
to the supply of e¤ort decreases the strength of the Olson e¤ect, in both
anarchic and democratic societies. As long as the unconstrained contributor
is relatively rich, however, the tension between the Olson- and Meltzer-
Richard e¤ects remains in place. Changes in distribution that benet the
unconstrained contributor at the expense of the median asset holder continue
to be dis-equalizing, all else equal. Such changes unambiguously increase
production under anarchy but have ambiguous e¤ects under democracy and
redistributive taxation. For innitesimal changes, this trade-o¤ is in general
described by equation (10), with eu inserted instead of er, and by (15) if
technology is given by a concave power function.
Now briey focus on the situation where the unconstrained contributor is
poorer than the mean, i.e. xu < 1=N: This assumption changes the analysis
radically, because, from equation (17), the unconstrained agents e¤ort is
now increasing in the tax rate. This means that the Meltzer-Richard e¤ect
is completely annulled, since a median voter who is poorer than the mean
now always chooses the highest possible tax rate. The analysis of this type
of society is not pursued further.
In sum, introduction of limits to the supply of e¤ort in general reduces
the positive e¤ects of inequality on public goods production, under democ-
racy as well an under anarchy. As long as the unconstrained, or marginal,
contributor to the public good is richer than the mean asset holder, the
tensions between the Olson- and Meltzer-Richard e¤ects described above
continue to exist. Increases in the wealth of the median asset holder at the
expense of the marginal contributor decreases production under anarchy,
but may either increase or decrease it under democracy and redistributive
taxation. The introduction of democracy and taxation benets both the
median asset holder and the e¤ort-supplying elite if and only if the median
voter is rich enough to choose a regressive tax system.
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7 Example: Finance of higher education
The suggestion in section 2 to think of the model in terms of farmers with
di¤erent holdings of agricultural land suggests that it might be relevant
in the context of local communities in developing countries. This might
indeed be the case. Public goods and common property resources are often
important in such settings (Jodha 1986), and in many developing countries,
power is increasingly devolved to democratically elected local governments,
as discussed in Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006). The model shows that the
introduction of local, democratic governments may qualitatively alter the
relationship between economic distribution and public goods production in
such settings.
A di¤erent eld where the model is relevant is that of higher education.
The model predicts that governments may some times tax the poor and sub-
sidize the rich, in order to stimulate the production of public goods. One
eld where this relationship is regularly observed is public nance of higher
education. Government spending on tertiary education is typically regres-
sive, since it transfers resources from all taxpayers to those who would have
the highest lifetime-income, even in the absence of the transfer (Barr 2004).
Such policies are usually justied with reference to positive externalities re-
lated to higher education. Highly educated individuals contribute more than
proportionally to the production of certain public goods, in particular the
generation and dissemination of knowledge (cf. Birdsall 1996).
Now, assume that knowledge and innovation are complementary to other
economic resources in the agentsindirect utility function (like x and G are
complementary in the utility function in the model). For example, techno-
logical innovations are often embodied in products, such as televisions and
computers and the utility derived from these innovations therefore depends
on the ability to purchase those products. Also, the benet obtained from
innovative methods of production typically depends on a persons ability to
adapt to new circumstances. This ability in turn depends on her level of
general education, and on her nancial resources (nancially well-endowed
individuals will nd it easier to invest in re-schooling or relocate to another
town for a new job). If this assumption holds, the model presented in the
previous sections predicts that countries with an equal distribution of eco-
nomic resources will be more likely to engage in public funding of tertiary
education than countries with an unequal distribution of resources.
UNESCO provides data for a number of countries on public nance of
higher education for the period 1999 to 2006 (UNESCO 2010). Table 1
investigates in panel regressions how per capita government spending on
tertiary education is related to economic inequality among the subset of
countries for which data on inequality is available.
[Insert Table 1]
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Inequality is measured by the gini coe¢ cient of income.6 The rst regres-
sion shows the bivariate relationship, while the next three include controls
for population, GDP, total government expenditure, region of the world and
year (estimates for year dummies not shown). Table A1 in the appendix
presents the countries included, the mean of the two main variables of in-
terest (per capita spending on tertiary education and inequality), and the
number of observations available for each country. To reduce the potential
impact of endogeneity, the gini variable is lagged two years. Note, however,
that since government spending on tertiary education is arguably regressive,
we should expect reverse causality to lead to a positive bias in the estimated
coe¢ cient, whereas the model predicts a negative e¤ect. GDP is also lagged
two years due to concerns about endogeneity. Column 2 shows the results of
estimating a pooled OLS regression; column 3 presents the estimates from a
random e¤ects model, while column 4 introduces country xed e¤ects. The
last exercise is particularly interesting since the inclusion of xed e¤ects al-
lows us to rule out that a correlation between inequality and spending on
tertiary education is caused by cultural, institutional or other stable country
characteristics that may potentially a¤ect both economic distribution and
government spending patterns.
Results are consistent with the hypothesis of a negative e¤ect of in-
equality on public nance of tertiary education. The gini variable is always
negative and signicant at the ve percent level or better. Since total gov-
ernment spending is controlled, this is not a result of tertiary education
spending proxying for a large public sector in general. Results are very
similar if we use the rst, third or fourth lags of inequality and GDP, rather
than the second. On the other hand, there is no signicant e¤ect of inequal-
ity when the current or rst leaded variables are used. This supports the
view that causality runs from inequality to spending and not the other way
around. The interpretation of these results o¤ered by our theoretical model
is that in equal countries, the "common man" derives higher benets from
the positive externalities of higher education than in unequal countries. He
is therefore also more willing to subsidize it.7
6 Income inequality is an imperfect proxy for the theoretical variable of interest, which is
inequality in assets complementary to innovation and knowledge. Some data on inequality
of physical and nancial assets (wealth) exists, but I refrain from using it for two reasons:
First, data is available only for a small subset of the countries in the sample. Second,
the theoretically relevant assets include not only physical and nancial assets, but also
human assets, such as the quality of primary and secondary education. Therefore, income
inequality might well be a better proxy for the underlying variable of interest than wealth
inequality.
7The results contrast with those in Zhang (2008) who nds a positive correlation be-
tween inequality and spending on higher education as a share of total spending on ed-
ucation. The di¤erence is partly driven by the fact that Zhang focuses on the e¤ect of
education spending on inequality, while this paper focuses on the e¤ect in the other di-
rection. Also, Zhang looks primarily at spending on higher education relative to spending
on other types of education, while this paper investigates absolute, per capita levels of
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8 Conclusion
Even in the presence of a well-functioning state, the provision of some pub-
lic goods, such as innovation, is still fully or partly left to private agents.
The paper points out that voters in a democracy may use the scal system
to stimulate the production of such goods. Government resources may for
example be used to subsidize higher education, which stimulates the produc-
tion of innovation and knowledge. However, such subsidization is typically
distributionally regressive, and is only a political equilibrium if the distri-
bution of resources complementary to the public good is su¢ ciently equal.
For example, voters in a democracy may only support spending on higher
education if they have the human and nancial resources necessary to take
advantage of the positive spillovers from advanced education and research.
I have presented a simple, Downsian model of political competition to illus-
trate these points. The model shows that the relationship between inequality
and public goods production is qualitatively altered when it is embedded in
a context of democracy and redistributive taxation. From another perspec-
tive, it also shows that the presence of public goods in a democratically
governed economy changes the politics of redistributive taxation. When
public goods are important, the median voter may choose a negative tax
rate, even if he is poorer than the mean, provided that the distribution of
economic resources is su¢ ciently equal. Therefore, the democratic, political
equilibrium might increase welfare for the wealthy elite as well as for the
"middle class", as represented by the median voter. It might even be a
Pareto improvement over the situation with no political intervention.
Under reasonable assumptions, the model predicts that equal countries
engage more heavily in public funding of higher education than unequal ones.
This hypothesis is supported in a panel analysis of government spending on
higher education in a broad sample of countries. The result is robust to the
introduction of year- and country xed e¤ects in the regressions.
expenditure. Glomm and Ravikumar (2003), Levy (2005) and Di Gioacchino and Sabani
(2009) investigate the relationship between inequality and public nance of education in
theoretical models. However, these papers do not consider positive externalities from
education.
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Appendix
Second derivative of Ui with respect to 
Di¤erentiating (8) with respect to  and collecting terms, we obtain:
@2Ui
@2
=

xr   1
N

 0
 
 1

 3
0@ 2   1N   xi+ 
xr   1N
  
xi + (
1
N   xi)

 2

 00( 1)
 0( 1) + 3
 1A
A su¢ cient but not necessary condition for this expression to be negative
is that  00
 
 1

< 0. Since  0
 
 1

= 1=G00( ( 1)), it holds that
 00
 
 1

=
 G000( ( 1)) 0( 1)
(G00( ( 1)))2
This is negative if G000 is negative. Therefore, a negative third derivative
of G is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for Ui to be universally
concave in  , as claimed in footnote 4.
Optimal tax rate with production given by a power function:
Given equation (11), which provides an expression for the e¤ort of agent
r, voters maximize:
Ui =

xi + (
1
N
  xi)



xr +

1
N
  xr


 
1 
for i 6= r. The rst order conditions with respect to  are:
1
N
  xi



xr + (
1
N
  xr)
 
1 
+
2( 1N   xr)
1  

xi + (
1
N
  xi)



xr + (
1
N
  xr)
 2 1
1 
= 0 (19)
Assuming that xi < 1N , we solve for  and obtain equation (12). Now,
i is a maximum if
@2Ui
@2
(i ) < 0. We prove that this is the case. First,
di¤erentiate the left-hand side of (19) with respect to  and collect terms::
@2Ui
@2
(i ) =
22
1  

1
N
  xi

1
N
  xr



xr +

1
N
  xr

i
 2 1
1 
+
3( 1N   xr)2
1  

xi + (
1
N
  xi)i



xr +

1
N
  xr

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 3 2
1 
< 0,
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1
N
  xi

1
N
  xr

i >

1
N
  xr

xi   2

1
N
  xi

xr
Now, insert the expression for i given in (12) and collect terms again:
3

1
N
  xi

1
N
  xr
 
(1  )xr
xr   1N
+
xi
xi   1N
!
>

1
N
  xr

xi   2

1
N
  xi

xr ,
xr > xi
This condition is always true and i is therefore a maximum.
[Insert Table A1]
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Figure 1  Public goods production under anarchy and democracy 
 Public goods 
production 
(G) 
Median 
wealth ( xm) 
1/N 
Democracy; 1rk Nx< −  
Democracy; 1rk Nx> −  
Anarchy 
 Table 1  Inequality and government expenditure on tertiary education 
  
Dependent variable: Per capita govt. expenditure 
on tertiary education (log) 
  OLS OLS 
Random 
effects 
Fixed 
effects 
Gini, 2nd lag -0.032 -0.016 -0.021 -0.024 
 
(2.80)*** (1.98)** (3.41)*** (2.55)** 
Population (log) 
 
-1.114 -1.219 -4.428 
  
(15.57)*** (14.07)*** (3.77)*** 
GDP, 2nd lag (log) 
 
0.587 0.807 0.165 
  
(3.91)*** (4.53)*** (0.32) 
Total govt. expenditure (log) 0.516 0.397 0.457 
  
(4.26)*** (2.70)*** (0.92) 
Central Asia 
 
-0.602 -0.877 
 
  
(2.09)** (2.74)*** 
 East Asia 
 
-0.067 -0.137 
 
  
(0.23) (0.42) 
 South Asia 
 
-0.411 -0.399 
 
  
(1.27) (1.17) 
 Latin America 
 
-0.23 -0.357 
 
  
(0.83) (1.32) 
 Central and Eastern Europe -0.189 -0.331 
 
  
(0.78) (1.57) 
 W. Europe and N. America -0.222 -0.526 
 
  
(0.7) (1.73)* 
 Sub-saharan Africa 
 
-0.118 0.031 
 
  
(0.41) (0.13) 
 Constant 4.38 -3.419 -4.275 62.951 
 
(8.06)*** (3.86)*** (3.74)*** (2.56)** 
Year effects No Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 149 142 142 142 
R-squared 0.04 0.94     
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors adjusted for within-country 
clustering. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
dependent variable is observed in the years 1999 to 2006, with gaps for some 
countries. The reference category for region of the world is Middle East and 
North Africa. Data sources: Tertiary education spending calculated from UNESCO 
(2010) and World Bank (2008). Gini, population, GDP, government expenditure 
from World Bank 2008. 
 
Table A1  Country data (means) 
       
Country 
Annual per capita 
govt. expenditure 
on tertiary 
education (2000 
prices) Gini Obs.   Country 
Annual per capita 
govt. expenditure 
on tertiary 
education (2000 
prices) Gini Obs. 
Jordan 16.0 36.4 1   Austria 312.1 29.1 1 
Morocco 13.9 39.5 1 
 
Belgium 305.0 33.0 1 
Tunisia 30.7 39.8 1 
 
Canada 430.2 32.6 1 
Belarus 24.0 29.7 1 
 
Denmark 683.8 24.7 1 
Bulgaria 15.7 31.8 2 
 
Finland 492.6 26.9 1 
Croatia 34.6 31.2 2 
 
Germany 269.7 28.3 1 
Estonia 52.7 36.6 4 
 
Greece 164.0 34.3 1 
Hungary 56.9 27.3 6 
 
Ireland 325.8 34.3 1 
Latvia 35.2 34.2 4 
 
Israel 228.3 39.2 1 
Lithuania 48.9 33.7 5 
 
Italy 167.6 36.0 1 
Poland 45.1 33.2 5 
 
Netherlands 331.9 30.9 1 
Romania 15.0 30.8 4 
 
Norway 800.0 25.8 1 
Russia 12.6 41.7 4 
 
Portugal 105.1 38.5 1 
Slovenia 148.1 30.9 1 
 
Spain 145.2 34.7 1 
Macedonia 9.0 34.4 1 
 
Sweden 588.4 25.0 1 
Turkey 27.7 41.7 2 
 
Switzerland 476.8 33.7 1 
Ukraine 14.4 28.4 3 
 
UK 201.3 36.0 1 
Azerbaijan 1.6 36.5 1 
 
United States 498.0 40.8 1 
Kazakhstan 5.2 34.4 2 
 
Bangladesh 0.9 33.4 1 
Kyrgyzstan 2.3 33.2 7 
 
India 4.1 36.8 1 
Tajikistan 0.6 33.1 2 
 
Burkina Faso 1.1 39.5 1 
New Zealand 236.4 36.2 1 
 
Cape Verde 13.2 50.5 1 
Philippines 4.1 45.3 2 
 
Côte d'Ivoire 7.1 43.8 1 
Thailand 21.4 42.3 3 
 
Guinea 2.1 38.6 1 
Argentina 55.8 51.5 4 
 
Kenya 2.5 42.5 1 
Bolivia 14.8 58.1 2 
 
Madagascar 0.8 40.5 2 
Brazil 31.7 58.0 6 
 
Mozambique 1.9 47.3 1 
Chile 28.4 55.3 3 
 
South Africa 23.8 57.8 1 
Colombia 13.6 57.7 5 
 
Swaziland 15.9 50.4 1 
Costa Rica 35.9 46.9 3 
 
Uganda 1.5 45.7 1 
Ecuador 0.9 53.6 1 
 
Zambia 1.2 53.4 1 
El Salvador 4.0 52.0 2 
     Guatemala 6.2 49.4 1 
     Mexico 55.1 49.2 3 
     Panama 47.8 53.9 3 
     Paraguay 10.7 57.1 3 
     Peru 8.3 52.4 4 
     Uruguay 33.9 45.1 5           
 
